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Question 
What are the impacts and consequences of lifting economic sanctions on poverty and economic 
growth? With the purpose of informing policy in Sudan, use case studies with similar dynamics to 
formulate lessons from other countries that have had sanctions lifted. 
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1.  Overview  
A number of scholars have highlighted the negative impact that economic sanctions have on the 
average population, whilst arguing that elites generally find ways to negotiate the sanctions 
(Mack & Khan, 2000; Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 2015, 2016; Oechslin, 2014; Peksen & Drury, 
2010). Moreover, these scholars also demonstrate the failure of sanctions to reach their desired 
result in most cases. Thus, the lifting of sanctions has a considerable impact on both poverty and 
economic development. However, the impact of the previous sanctions often creates a more 
vulnerable socio-economic environment which requires specific interventions to encourage 
economic development once the sanctions are lifted in order to encourage economic 
development and to ensure that the poverty gap does not increase. 
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This rapid review synthesises findings from rigorous academic, practitioner, and policy 
references, focusing on recent and seminal works with the aim of highlighting the impact of lifting 
sanctions on poverty and economic development. There is a further aim of helping to inform 
policymakers in Sudan in the event of sanctions being fully lifted. Therefore, an analysis of the 
impact of lifting sanctions in other countries – Myanmar and Iran – with an economy also reliant 
on hydrocarbons will form the basis of this review. Countries like Cuba (where tourism dominates 
the economy), who have also recently had their sanctions lifted, were discounted as the 
dynamics of their economies bore little resemblance to Sudan and therefore minimal lessons 
could be gained.   
It must be noted that all countries respond differently to sanctions, and the lifting of sanctions, 
due to political, historical, geographical and economic factors. However, there are still lessons 
available, provided they are contextualised within the dynamics of the country studied. 
The literature regarding sanctions does not often focus on the impact of lifting sanctions and 
studies that do are predominantly prediction orientated analyses. Consequently, the impact of 
lifting sanctions will be analysed based on extracting evidence from the countries’ responses, 
policy suggestions, and prediction model analyses using the case studies of Iran and Myanmar.  
Key findings are as follows: 
 The structural, economic, and social damage caused by sanctions is immense, and thus 
significant investment is needed to rebalance the society. 
 For oil producing countries where significant income will be achieved in one area 
following the lifting of the sanctions, it is recommended that an independent sovereign 
wealth fund for investment is created in order to address the above imbalances. 
 Technologies and standards are developed during the time of the sanctions, leaving 
industries behind their international competitors when sanctions are lifted. Thus, 
investment is needed for modernisation in order to make them competitive again.  
 Following the lifting of sanctions, banks and businesses are often sceptical of the 
reputational risk and the lack of clarity of the sanctions lifted and these fears need to be 
eased in order to boost business and investment. 
 Sanctions result in the financial and banking sector falling behind in international 
standards of practise, thus they require considerable restructuring in order to attract 
international business. 
 In oil-rich countries, sanctions often lead to the rest of the economy being left behind and 
oil becoming the centre of the economy, upon the lifting of sanctions the influx of foreign 
currency can lead to considerable appreciation of the local currency, which further 
damages the rest of the economy as imports become cheaper. 
 Following the lifting of sanctions the pressure on the exchange rate needs to be balanced 
through expansionary monetary policies that allow the currency to appreciate within a 
reasonable limit.  
 Serious investment and resources are needed for the diversification of the economy 
following the lifting of sanctions. 
 Financial legislation and industrial and trade policies need to be adapted in order to 
create an attractive environment for foreign direct investment and increase access to 
capital, technology, and market opportunities.  
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 The lifting of sanctions can worsen the income gap, as elites manage to take advantage 
of the opening up of the markets and cheap imports become available, thus funds must 
be spent on developing the wider economy and creating jobs. 
2. Lifting Sanctions 
Sanctions have a significant impact on the economic growth and levels of poverty of the 
sanctioned countries. For instance they: 
 lead to an increase in the poverty gap with deprived sections of the population feeling the 
impact the most (Neuenkirch & Neumeier, 2016); 
 damage income inequality (Afesorgbor & Mahadevan, 2016);  
 create regional imbalances, as resources are refocused to power and production centres 
(Lee, 2016); 
 can result in leaders magnifying the sanctions' negative effect on the economy to prevent 
the population from revolting (Oechslin, 2014); 
 significantly decrease the GDP per capita of the sanctioned countries (Neuenkirch & 
Neumeier, 2015); 
 damage the economic growth of women, minority communities and other marginalised 
groups (Drury & Peksen, 2012); 
 have a negative impact on the living standards and humanitarian situation of the 
population (Rarick, 2006). 
 
Therefore, once sanctions are lifted there is a great deal of damage that needs to be repaired. 
Alnasrawi (2001) argues that the damage caused by sanctions on the economy, poverty gap, 
standard of living, and infrastructure greatly impact the cost and period of reconstruction and 
economic growth following the lifting of the sanctions or regime change. Whilst Afesorgbor and 
Mahadevan (2016) argue that the widening income equality caused by sanctions is difficult to 
address even once sanctions are lifted. This further compounds the issue of the economic 
recovery and negatively impacts the process. Thus, even though the lifting of sanctions creates 
new opportunities, not everyone can take advantage of these and this can often lead to 
segments of the society being left behind. 
 
Beyond the structural and socioeconomic damage that sanctions cause, they also change the 
dynamics of the economy, which needs to be considered when lifting sanctions. For instance, 
sections of the economy that previously relied on markets which they may no longer have access 
to, for either the sale of their goods of the purchase of parts or equipment, would need significant 
investment and development once sanctions are lifted in order to make them competitive again. 
Economies, particularly mineral rich ones, also tend to refocus on areas where they can still 
attract business, thus making the economies overly dependent on these areas, therefore 
significant investment and resources need to be focused on diversification in the event of 
sanctions being lifted. Finally, the opening up of the world markets also has dangers, as if not 
managed properly it can lead to currency appreciation, which in turn would have a negative 
impact on local production as international markets become cheaper.  
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Below, these elements are contextualised using the case studies of Myanmar and Iran, which 
like Sudan have economies largely dependent on oil exports and have recently gone through the 
process of having sanctions lifted.   
3. Myanmar 
The EU and US first imposed sanctions against Myanmar in 1991 and 1997 respectively. These 
sanctions were gradually increased as Myanmar was perceived to be making no progress 
towards democracy nor demonstrating respect for human rights. Alongside the targeted 
sanctions, the EU (1997) and US (1989) withdrew the Generalised Scheme of Preferences 
(GSP), which allows exporters from developing countries to pay less import duties or none at all. 
Since 2011, Myanmar has initiated vital political and economic reforms and the EU and US 
suspended sanctions, with the exception of the arms embargo, in 2013 and 2016 respectively 
(Giumelli & Ivan, 2013; Hadar, 1998).  
Impact of Sanctions 
According to Portela (2014), the arms embargo has had little impact on Myanmar, as they have 
managed to buy arms from China, Russia, Ukraine, Serbia, India and North Korea, and would 
not be able to afford much of the arms available from the US or EU. The gems and timber 
embargoes impacted legal traders mainly, as it forced trade to go through intermediaries in 
Thailand. GSP suspension is argued to have affected the economy generally, rather than directly 
impacting the areas it targeted, thus by implication penalising the population at large. Portela 
argues that sanctions in Myanmar shielded the country from external influence while contributing 
to its underdevelopment by giving an excuse for economic under-performance in Myanmar due 
to economic mismanagement. The majority of the sanctions did not impact the regime at the 
same level, as they aligned themselves closer to China, India, and Thailand, managing to sell 
natural resources whilst the rest of the economy struggled (Portela, 2014). An indirect effect of 
the sanctions imposed on the mining industry is that it is now lagging behind in terms of 
standards and efficiency (Grabo, 2016).  
 
Impact of Lifting Sanctions 
Using a  gravity model to distinguish if the actions of imposing and lifting the sanctions on 
Myanmar had significant effects on the EU’s imports from Myanmar, Grabo (2016) argues the 
EU’s imports from Myanmar were positively affected by the lifting of the sanctions, but the 
imposition of  sanctions did not have a significant effect. However, sanctions did influence the 
post-sanction era, as new requirements, technologies, and standards were developed during the 
time of the sanctions, which prevented the industries reaching their full export potential after the 
lifting. At the same time, following the lifting of sanctions banks and businesses were still 
sceptical of the reputational risk and the lack of clarity of the sanctions lifted, leading to some still 
avoiding doing business in Myanmar (Grabo, 2016). 
During the sanction era in Myanmar there was a significant rise in the exports of natural 
resources; in 2000 it only accounted for 5.4 percent of total exports, whereas by 2008 this figure 
stood at 48.8 percent. During this time, Myanmar’s per capita exports ($159 in 2010) have 
remained the lowest among members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
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The sharp rise in resource exports, along with the poor performance of the rest of the economy, 
has increased the concern about the effects of Dutch disease.
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 Kubo (2014) measures trade 
potential with the theoretically predicted trade value by using an augmented gravity model with 
data from 10 neighbouring countries in South Asia and South-East Asia. According to Kubo, if 
the possible Dutch disease effects of natural resource exports are taken into account the 
counterfactual prediction values are less than the actual non-resource exports, implying limited 
room for non-resource export growth even after the lifting of sanctions. The lifting of sanctions 
restored access to EU and US markets, and reinstated the benefits of GSP, which in turn 
enhances Myanmar’s exports to these destinations. Apparel, including footwear, will be an 
important item for export to the US and EU in the immediate future. However, when the impact of 
Dutch disease is taken into account, Myanmar may not follow the growth path of other resource-
rich South-East Asian countries that achieved economic diversification despite their abundant 
natural resources, such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. This is due to Myanmar having the 
highest ratio of natural resource exports to total exports in South-East Asia (Kubo, 2014). 
 
4. Iran 
Iran first faced sanctions from the US during the 1979-81 hostage crisis following Iran’s Islamic 
Revolution. Iran has since faced international sanctions for its nuclear programme, which violates 
its obligations to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). These sanctions were implemented by the 
UN in 2006 and the EU in 2007 (more substantially since 2010), whilst the US has steadily 
increased its sanctions since 1979 (Patterson, 2013). Due to Iran’s compliance with an 
agreement that was reached and endorsed by Iran and the P5+1 in July 2015, the sanctions 
were largely lifted in January 2016 (Einhorn, 2016).  
As sanctions against Iran were only lifted, and in some cases eased, in January 2016, there is 
not much written yet as to the impact it has had on the economy. However, there are many 
projections as to what the impact would be, which can be analysed to gain a better 
understanding of the impact of lifting the sanctions in Iran. However, it is first important to 
examine the impact of the sanctions themselves on poverty and economic development. 
Impact of Sanctions 
Sanctions against Iran have had a negative impact on the economic growth as the economy has 
gradually contracted as a result of the limited markets. Since the tightening of sanctions in 2012 
growth dropped to negative 6.8 and 1.9 percent in 2012 and 2013 respectively, with oil 
production dropping by one million barrels a day. Production in the auto industry declined by half 
and in the construction sector by 3.6 and 3.1 percent in 2012 and 2013 respectively (Word Bank, 
2015).  
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 Dutch disease is the negative impact on an economy of anything that gives rise to a sharp inflow of foreign 
currency, such as the discovery of large oil reserves. The currency inflows lead to currency appreciation, making 
the country’s other products less price competitive on the export market. It also leads to higher levels of cheap 
imports and can lead to deindustrialisation as industries apart from resource exploitation are moved to cheaper 
locations. 
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In 2014, GDP per a head fell a significantly by 17% from $6376 to $5293; this contraction was 
said to be the result of sanctions affecting the energy, banking and financial sectors, since 
increased sanctions in 2012. The sanctions targeted oil exports, which is the Iranian economy’s 
main source of funds. As a result the oil output in Iran drastically decreased between 2012 and 
the lifting of sanctions in 2016. At the same time, inflation in Iran increased from 10.7% in 
2009/10 to 39.266 % in 2013/142, resulting in more people living below the poverty line. High 
inflation was partly down to the significant increase in the cost of importing and exporting goods. 
Male youth unemployment stood at 26.4% in 2013, whilst female youth unemployment stood at 
41.7% in 2013. Thus, sanctions had a dramatic impact on the economic growth and poverty 
levels in Iran, leading to high levels of unemployment, high inflation and a falling GDP 
(Farzanegan, 2015). 
Impact of Lifting Sanctions 
As already highlighted, due to sanctions Iran’s economy contracted and hydrocarbons became 
the main economic driver, albeit at a reduced level. Using a global general-equilibrium simulation 
model to quantify the global effects of lifting Iran’s economic sanctions, Ianchovichina et al. 
(2016) argue that lifting Iran’s economic sanctions would lead to a per capita welfare rise of 3.7 
percent, mainly due to the lifting of the oil embargo. However, the benefits in the short-term 
would stem from the hydrocarbon industry, rather than any significant expansion of the rest of the 
economy. If the lifting of sanctions lead to Iran’s oil exports returning to the pre-2012 levels, one 
million barrels per day could be added to the world market, which in turn would bring down prices 
and lead to potential Dutch Disease (Ianchovichina et al., 2016).  In order to deal with Dutch 
disease Iran established an oil stabilisation fund in 2000 with the aim of reducing the volatility 
effects of oil revenues on the macro economy. However, according to Farzanegan (2015) the 
board lacks independence from the centres of power in Iran, thus politicising the institute and 
preventing it from carrying out its duties for the benefit of the country rather than the ruling elite.  
In Iran, the possibility of Dutch Disease is a tangible reality, as Iran’s strong reliance on oil 
exports could lead to an appreciation of the local currency. It is predicted that local non-tradable 
goods’ price will rise, as they are not set by the international markets and the labour will gravitate 
towards them away from local production. Moreover, as the Iranian Rial rises, so will the cost of 
their exports, thus making them less competitive on the international market. At the same time, 
imports will become cheaper, further antagonising the issue. Therefore, the increase of oil 
production and the resulting increase of revenues need to be managed carefully and there needs 
to be adequate support for exports and diversification (Hotz et al., 2017).  
According to Holtz et al. (2017) to counteract Dutch disease Iran should: 
1. Use its sovereign wealth fund to manage the inflow of investments and invest in 
economic diversification, thus directing and controlling the demand surging into the 
economy in order to keep the non-oil sector competitive and promote long-term 
sustainable growth. 
2. Adapt financial legislation as well as industrial and trade policies in order to create an 
attractive environment for foreign direct investment and increase access to capital, 
technology, and market opportunities.  
3. Balance pressure on the exchange rate through expansionary monetary policies that 
allow the currency to appreciate within a reasonable limit. For example, providing more 
currency to slow the Rial’s appreciation whilst monitoring inflation. 
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Using annual data from 1970-2012, Farzanegan (2016) examines the response of income 
inequality to the positive oil rent shocks in Iran with the purpose of examining the impact of lifting 
the sanctions on income equality. He finds that oil booms worsen income distribution in Iran. 
Therefore, the increase of oil production and export following the lifting of the sanctions will result 
in a widening of the poverty gap, rather than having a positive result on the wider population, as 
oil incomes are not distributed beyond the elites.  
Aside from the hydrocarbon industry, sanctions heavily impacted the automobile and 
pharmaceutical industries in Iran, with the production of cars falling from 1.6 million prior to the 
tightening of sanctions in 2012 to 700,000 after. This was mainly down to the increased cost, as 
well as ban, of importing parts as well as the machinery to make production more efficient. 
Therefore, these industries are highlighted as needing investment and development in order to 
make them competitive and allow the economy to grow beyond the hydrocarbon industry. 
However, the labour market in Iran has deteriorated to such a level that it is estimated that the 
Iranian economy needs to create five million jobs over the next 5 years to keep the 
unemployment rate at 10 percent, thus diversification needs to extend well beyond these two 
industries (Word Bank, 2015).  
As development in Iran has stagnated as a result of the sanctions there are a number of areas 
that need investment and new technologies. For instance, the aviation and rail infrastructure 
sectors in Iran need to be updated. However, due to the ambiguity of the US’ long-term position 
on the deal there is an unwillingness of banks to commit to doing business with Iran over fears of 
future prosecution by the US. Therefore, more needs to be done to encourage international 
organisations to invest in, and do business with, Iran. At the same time, Iran’s financial and 
banking sector has fallen far behind in international standards of practise as a result of the 
sanctions, thus it requires considerable restructuring if it is to attract international business and 
financing and this is an area the Iranian government needs to focus on (Sharab, 2016). 
5. Lessons for Sudan 
The economy of Sudan has long been neglected with the majority of funds being spent on arms 
and localised conflicts, leaving education and technological developments severely behind 
international standards. Moreover, the exports of hydrocarbons have become the basis of the 
economy, as the rest have suffered due to the sanctions (Aluoch, 2015; Nour, 2014). Sudan is 
neither an attractive place to invest nor do business due to excessive regulations, as well as the 
regressive financial and banking sector. Additionally, due to a lack of investment in, and access 
to foreign, technologies the industries are far behind their international counterparts which will 
impact their competitiveness in the light of sanctions being lifted (Arabi & Abdalla, 2013). Sudan 
has also failed to deliver basic services during the sanction period or develop infrastructure often 
using sanctions as an excuse, thus needing significant development and investment upon the 
lifting of sanctions (Elsheikh and Elamin, 2016). Sudan also has high unemployment rates of 17 
percent, as well as low employment opportunities, which contribute to the economic disparity 
found in many regions of Sudan.
2
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 https://borgenproject.org/poverty-sudan/  
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Correspondingly, there are many lessons for Sudan from both the actions taken in and the 
actions developed for Myanmar and Iran to deal with the issues above once sanctions are lifted. 
Namely: 
1. The creation of a sovereign wealth fund in Iran is an important lesson, as it allows for the 
wealth from hydrocarbons to be used to finance development, manage and diversify the 
economy, and control the currency. However, as highlighted with the case of Iran, 
independence is key so that the fund works for the interests of general population and 
not the elites. Many of the lessons below are connected to having a funding scheme 
available in order to carry out these policies. 
2. Due to the technologies and standards having developed considerably during the time of 
the sanctions, investment is needed for the modernisation of the industries in order to 
make them competitive again.  
3. As an oil-focused economy, like Iran and Myanmar, Sudan will have to manage the 
effects of Dutch Disease carefully to ensure the economy doesn’t falter.   
4. Serious investment and resources are needed for the diversification of the economy 
following the lifting of sanctions. 
5. The exchange rate needs to be balanced through expansionary monetary policies that 
allow the currency to appreciate within a reasonable limit.  
6. Financial legislation and industrial and trade policies need to be adapted in order to 
create an attractive environment for foreign direct investment and increase access to 
capital, technology, and market opportunities.  
7. At the same time, the financial and banking sector need restructuring in order to attract 
international business. 
8. The economy and job market need to be developed carefully so that the population as a 
whole can benefit from the lifting of sanctions, rather than elites managing to take 
advantage of the opening up of the markets at the expense of the wider population. 
9. Clarity needs to be created, by and amongst the international community, over the 
position of the sanctions in order to ensure that banks and businesses are do not fear a 
reputational risk or future fines as a result of doing business in, and with, Sudan.  
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